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 Better Work: Problems with Exporting 
the Better Factories Cambodia Project 
to Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam 
 Paul Harpur 
 Over the last decade, the International Labor Organization (ILO) has managed a 
dynamic project in Cambodia which has resulted in drastically improved working 
conditions in Cambodian textile and apparel factories. The success of the Better Fac-
tories Cambodia project has led the ILO to expand the project beyond Cambodia to 
other jurisdictions. The new Better Work Project will develop micro-level projects in 
Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam to improve the respect for workers’ rights in those juris-
dictions. This article analyses what enabled the Better Factories Cambodia Project to 
be so successful and analyse the barriers in operationalizing the Better Work Projects 
in Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam. 
 During the 1990s, the production of retail goods increasingly moved from wealthy, developed countries to less-developed countries 
where production costs were cheaper. Reports began to emerge that 
the working conditions in some less-developed countries resembled 
sweatshops and the competitive advantage gained by the outsourcing 
of products often came at the expense of the human rights of workers. 1 
As globalization removed the barriers restricting trade across borders, 
corporations took advantage of the opportunities to outsource work to 
intermediary agents and factories across the globe. Substantial regula-
tory challenges have been created by the increase in these global sup-
ply chains, which often contain a large number of separate corporate 
entities situated in literally dozens of different nations. Both developed 
and developing countries proposed a range of regulatory interventions 
to improve labor rights while maintaining trade. Less-developed coun-
tries have struggled to find strategies to maintain their economic growth 
while protecting labor rights. Cambodia is one less-developed coun-
try that has worked with the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
successfully to increase the recognition of labor rights without eco-
nomic harm. 
 The regulatory interventions in Cambodia, which resulted in increased 
labor rights without damaging trade, were made possible by the micro 
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and macro involvement of the ILO in developing and implementing 
the Better Factories Cambodia Project. The effectiveness of the Better 
Factories Cambodia Project has resulted in the ILO expanding this proj-
ect into the independent Better Work Projects in the countries of Jordan, 
Lesotho, and Vietnam. 
 This article argues that the Better Factories Cambodia Project model 
can be successfully transplanted to Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam only 
if the Better Work Projects carefully manages the challenges associated 
with the transplantation. This article analyses the barriers which the 
Better Work Projects will confront in transplanting the Better Factories 
Cambodia Project model and recommends how these challenges can 
be managed. To analyse the barriers associated with the transplantation 
of the Better Factories Cambodia Project model, this article uses a doc-
trinal comparative law approach. This approach is used to analyse the 
similarities and differences between the jurisdictions and the range of 
incentives available to the Better Work Projects to encourage participat-
ing countries and their factories to respect labor conditions. 
 THE BETTER FACTORIES CAMBODIA PROJECT 
 The ILO is the paramount international institution charged with ensur-
ing that countries maintain a regulatory framework that facilitates the 
protection of labor rights. 2 The ILO was founded in 1919 by the Treaty of 
Versailles and became the fi rst specialized agency of the United Nations 
in 1946. The ILO’s roles include conducting discussions with govern-
ments, employer groups and employee groups, drafting treaties, and 
handling their ratifi cation. The ILO has drafted numerous conventions 
which aim to protect labor rights. Due to the support from the United 
Nations and ILO member countries, the ILO arguably has considerable 
credibility in setting labor standards and vehicles for their enforcement. 
 Historically, the ILO has encouraged compliance with labor standards 
prescribed in conventions through moral persuasion, publicity, shame, 
diplomacy, dialogue, and technical assistance. 3 While the ILO has tra-
ditionally been involved at a macro level by encouraging nations to 
establish a regulatory framework in which labor rights can be respected, 
more recently, the ILO has become increasingly directly involved with 
ensuring that labor standards are respected in international supply 
chains by becoming involved at the micro level. 4 One of the ILO’s most 
successful projects has been the Better Factories Cambodia Project. 
 Cambodia is a country in Southeast Asia with approximately 13.3 
million people. 5 This less- developed country has suffered some major 
blows in the recent past. During the rule of the Khmer Rouge Regime 
from 1975 to 1979, over two million people were victims of genocide. 
The Khmer Rouge lost power when Vietnam invaded in the Cambodian–
Vietnamese War which resulted in Vietnamese occupation from 1975 to 
1989. Cambodia then benefi ted from international intervention during 
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the United Nations’ Transitional Authority in Cambodia from 1992 to 
1993. To date, the United Nations and other international bodies are 
heavily involved in supporting Cambodia through removing landmines, 
funding education, and supporting democracy. 6 This article focuses on 
the international support Cambodia has received to promote a vibrant 
export textiles and apparel industry that respects labor rights. The ILO 
is driving the labor rights intervention in Cambodia through the Better 
Factories Cambodia Project. 
 The Better Factories Cambodia Project became possible initially due 
to a free trade agreement between the United States and Cambodia 
called the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement of 
1999. This agreement sought to promote Cambodia’s fl edgling export 
market, which was responsible for approximately 75 percent of all 
Cambodia’s exports. 7 When the United States was negotiating the free 
trade agreement, the United States desired to ensure that their market 
was not fl ooded by sweatshop products. Despite the passage of the 
1997 Cambodian Labor Code, labor abuse was relatively common in 
Cambodia’s approximately 200 factories in 1999. 8 To reduce the instance 
of sweatshop products being sold in the United States, the United 
States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement linked labor rights 
with increased trade opportunities through a social clause. 
 A social clause links countries’ treatment of social issues, such as 
human rights or labor rights, with continuing trade. 9 These social clauses 
can either rely upon countries’ stated intentions to enforce labor rights 
or can have provisions to motivate compliance. Provisions that enforce 
compliance can either rely upon enforcement provisions or encourage 
compliance through linking trade incentives to respecting labor rights. 
The United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement incorpo-
rated a social clause with trade incentives in a dynamic approach. 
 To monitor the labor rights in the FTA, the Cambodian parties invited 
the ILO to become involved at the micro and macro level in Cambodia. 
After consulting with the country’s parties, factories, and trade unions, the 
ILO agreed to monitor labor conditions in Cambodian factories produc-
ing textile and apparel products for export to the United States. 10 The way 
in which the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement 
linked labor rights at the factory level, auditing by the ILO, and the use 
of trade incentives, had not been attempted prior to this agreement. 11 
 To monitor labor conditions, the ILO developed a project called 
the ILO Garment Sector Working Conditions Improvement Project. 
Subsequently, in 2001, this project changed its name to the Better 
Factories Cambodia Project, which is the name used in this article. Better 
Factories Cambodia provided assistance to Cambodia by providing guid-
ance and support in improving domestic labor laws, providing advice to 
factories, and generally improving Cambodia’s capacity to improve labor 
conditions. Arguably, the aspect of the project which had the greatest 
impact on improving labor conditions in Cambodia was the rigorous 
factory audits. 
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 Factory audits remain a major part of the Better Factories Project. 
To generate these factory audits, the Better Factories Project’s teams 
inspect factories three months after factories sign up with the project. 
After providing a report to the factory, six months later, Better Factories’ 
inspectors re-audit the factory and make both reports publicly avail-
able in quarterly synthesis reports. 12 After this initial period, factories 
are inspected approximately every nine months and the results are 
uploaded onto the project’s Information Management System’s Web site. 
The factory can then use its password to view its factory audit or give 
its password to third parties who can also view factories’ audits directly 
from the Better Factories Cambodia Project’s Web site. 
 The Better Factories Cambodia Project summarizes the factory audit 
data from the Information Management System and creates overall syn-
thesis reports. These synthesis reports provide reasonably accurate data 
on what is occurring in Cambodia’s factories. These synthesis reports 
were previously used by the United States to determine whether or not 
Cambodia was entitled to benefi t from increased trade access through 
the trade incentive. The ILO was engaging here in a major micro-level 
project. The ILO was not assessing the extent to which Cambodia 
enforced its laws; the ILO was assessing whether Cambodian factories 
respected labor rights. Even though the conduct of the Cambodian gov-
ernment was not being assessed, clearly the Cambodian government 
had a vested interest in ensuring Cambodian factories passed the ILO’s 
audits. 
 The existence of the trade incentive was arguably a signifi cant motive 
for the Cambodian government to adopt substantial regulatory interven-
tions to ensure Cambodian factories’ labor conditions met international 
standards, which would pass the ILO’s inspections. In 1996, Cambodia 
enacted the 1997 Cambodian Labor Code. This enactment had a num-
ber of worker protections. The largest problem in Cambodia was not 
the existence of labor laws but the failure to enforce those laws. Kolbe 
analysed the literature on the situation in Cambodia and concluded that 
prior to the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement 
there were “pervasive violations of health and safety standards embod-
ied in the Cambodian Labor Code, including inadequate toilet facilities, 
inadequate medical care and poor ventilation in factories.” 13 This created 
a substantial barrier to Cambodia receiving the benefi ts from the trade 
incentives. 
 To improve domestic labor standards, Cambodia utilized the assis-
tance of the ILO. The United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade 
Agreement did not require all factories to participate in the Better 
Factories Project. The voluntary nature of the Better Factories Project 
created concerns in Cambodia that some factories would become free 
riders. 14 The concern was that free-riding factories would gain the ben-
efi ts of the national positive trade incentives without improving their fac-
tories’ labor conditions. This would provide free-riding factories with a 
signifi cant economic advantage over factories that respected labor rights. 
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As factories that abused labor rights would reduce their labor costs, this 
would likely result in factories that respected labor rights losing trade 
to free-riders. This would create pressure upon factories that respected 
their workers’ labor rights to reduce their labor costs by lowering work-
ing conditions. 15 In addition to internal pressure upon factories to cut 
labor standards, the Cambodian government was also concerned that 
the existence of free-riders threatened the increased market access that 
Cambodian exports enjoyed under the United States–Cambodia Bilateral 
Textile Trade Agreement. 
 To reduce the problem of free-riders and to increase the involvement 
of the ILO in improving labor standards, the Cambodian government 
implemented Ministerial Regulation 108 of 2001 which only permitted 
factories that were participating in the Better Factories Project to gain 
the benefi ts from the positive trade incentives fl owing from the United 
States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement. The Cambodian 
government achieved this through only giving export licenses to fac-
tories that participated in the Better Factories Cambodia Project. 16 This 
approach was not perfect. As the Better Factories Cambodia Project did 
not have any enforcement powers and the issue of trade incentives was 
implemented nationally, individual factories that rated poorly on the 
audit may not necessarily have lost trade benefi ts if most other factories 
in Cambodia passed the audit. 
 The positive incentive under the Better Factories Project was pos-
sible due to the operation of the Multi-Fibre Agreement. This agree-
ment permitted countries that imported products to place quotas on 
textile imports when surges in imports of particular products threatened 
domestic industries. This enabled the United States to provide Cambodia 
additional market access in the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile 
Trade Agreement. The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing resulted in 
these quotas being removed in 2005. On its face, the removal of the trade 
incentive reduced the motivation for Cambodia to ensure labor rights 
were respected. This article now analyses the research that demonstrates 
that labor conditions continued to improve while the trade incentive was 
operational under the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade 
Agreement and also when this trade incentive was removed. 
 The regulatory framework in Cambodia has not signifi cantly altered 
since the quotas were removed. After the trade incentives ceased to 
operate, the Cambodian government has continued the policy of requir-
ing all factories that are exporting manufactured textiles and apparel 
to participate in the Better Factories Cambodia Project. Due to this 
policy, the research indicates that the respect for labor rights has not 
diminished when the trade incentive was no longer operational. Pulaski 
has reviewed the results from the fi rst eight synthesis reports and has 
concluded that labor conditions in Cambodia have improved due to 
the ILO’s involvement. 17 She noted that 61 percent of factories have 
implemented about half the suggestions fl owing from the audits. When 
the suggestions concerned wage-related matters, Pulaski notes that the 
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synthesis reports indicate 95 percent of factories complied with the audit 
suggestions, but only 41 percent complied with suggestions concerning 
hours of work and overtime. Wells performed an analysis of published 
research on the status of labor conditions in Cambodia. 18 He observed 
that companies such as Nike and Disney, which had left Cambodia 
prior to 1999, have returned due to the reliable factory audits and the 
improvements in labor conditions. Wells has concluded: 
 Based on evidence provided in these reports from 2001 to 2005, it 
appears that while there is a considerable distance to go in achieving 
full compliance with international and Cambodian labor standards . . . 
[The United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement] 
with its ILO plant monitoring led to signifi cant improvement in many 
important labor standards. 19 
 Based upon the ILO-produced synthesis reports and the literature, it 
appears the Better Work Cambodia Project has had a signifi cant, positive 
infl uence on workers’ rights in Cambodia. 
 Why has the Better Factories Cambodia Project been so successful, 
even without a trade incentive motivating compliance? Perhaps one rea-
son that Cambodian labor conditions continue to be respected after the 
trade incentives ended is the culture that was created during the period 
of time when the trade incentive was operational. Cambodia gained a 
reputation for respecting labor rights and could use this as a competitive 
advantage over other jurisdictions. While other jurisdictions could have 
private corporate social responsibility supply chain auditors, Cambodian 
factories could rely upon ILO audits. 20 
 In addition, the Cambodian government has continued the program 
of reforming Cambodian labor laws, which started when the trade 
incentive was operational. The ILO, the United States, and Cambodia 
have worked together to identify regulatory improvements. One major 
improvement was the development of the Arbitration Council to hear 
disputes. 21 The Arbitration Council has become extremely effective 
in hearing disputes and has the confi dence of factories and unions 
to resolve disputes justly. 22 In this industrial climate, workers became 
increasingly collectivized and empowered. 23 Once workers became col-
lectivized, they were in a stronger position to resist unilateral actions by 
factory management through domestic and international campaigns. 
 While the increased respect for workers’ rights is extremely positive, 
the recognition of workers’ rights arguably increases labor costs. The 
increased cost of production may make some countries and factories 
reluctant to participate fully in similar schemes. It is therefore important 
to determine whether the improvement in labor rights has resulted in 
any economic harm. Considering the size of the export textiles and 
apparel industry in Cambodia and the growth enjoyed by this sector, 
it is arguable that the Better Factories Cambodia Project has provided 
a positive boost to Cambodia’s economy. It is possible to track how 
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Cambodia’s economy has continued to grow during the operation of the 
Better Factories Cambodia Project. Eighty percent of Cambodia’s exports 
are connected with exports in the textile and apparel industries and 
Cambodia has become the fi rst developing country to achieve $1 billion 
USD in annual exports. 24 Part of this economic growth can be attrib-
uted to the United States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement. 
During the fi rst six years of this agreement Cambodia’s textile and 
apparel exports quintupled to $1.9 billion USD and employment levels 
almost tripled. Rather than resulting in economic damage, the Better 
Factories Cambodia Project can be associated with substantial economic 
improvements in Cambodia. 25 
 BETTER FACTORIES CAMBODIA BECOMES BETTER WORK 
 The success of the Better Factories Cambodia Project has motivated 
the ILO to use this project as a launching platform to expand the Better 
Factories Program by transplanting this model into other nations. In 
2009, the ILO Better Factories Project became the Independent Better 
Factories Project and the Better Work Project was created. 26 The Better 
Work Project is currently developing projects with Jordan, Vietnam, 
and Lesotho. 27 This article now analyses the challenges the Better Work 
Projects will confront in transplanting the Better Factory Cambodia 
Project model into Jordan, Vietnam, and Lesotho. 
 The Development of the Better Work Projects 
 When transplanting a legal project from one jurisdiction to another, 
it is crucial to consider the historical, social, economic, political, cul-
tural, and psychological context which has impacted on the operation 
of the existing laws. 28 The fact that a law has successfully achieved its 
purposes in one jurisdiction does not mean that same regulatory model 
will achieve the same outcome in another jurisdiction. Montesquieu 
famously declared in 1748 that “political and civil laws of each nation . . . 
should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they 
are framed that it should be a great chance if those of one nation suit 
another.” 29 Lord Denning has remarked on the problems of transplanting 
laws where his Honour observed that: “Just as with an English oak, so 
with the English common law. You cannot transplant it to the African 
continent and expect it to retain the tough character which it has in 
England. It will fl ourish indeed but it needs careful tending.” 30 
 Perhaps the least challenging legal transplant confronting the ILO is 
the Better Work Vietnam Project. Cambodia and Vietnam have compara-
tively similar Southeast Asian cultures and share a common border. In 
contrast, Jordan’s culture is based around Arab and Islamic infl uences 
and is situated in the Middle East, and Lesotho has a tribal African cul-
ture and is surrounded on all sides by South Africa. Economically, all of 
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these countries have substantial textile and apparel sectors. For exam-
ple, Jordan’s export textile and apparel sector made up approximately 
30 percent of this country’s total exports in 2005 and the sector employs 
over 54, 000 workers (two thirds of whom are guest workers). 31 Similarly 
to Jordan, both Vietnam and Lesotho have signifi cant export textile and 
apparel industries. While all three countries have textile and apparel 
exports, the economies of these jurisdictions are substantially differ-
ent. Lesotho is a small country with a gross domestic product (GDP) of 
approximately $3.8 billion USD while Cambodia’s GDP is approximately 
$30.6 billion USD, Vietnam’s GDP is approximately $85 billion USD, and 
Jordan’s GDP is approximately $26.8 billion USD and supported by large 
oil exports. 
 Regardless of the similarities between jurisdictions, a law will have 
the greatest probability of being successfully transplanted if key stake-
holders in the transplanted country are consulted and the transplanted 
law is modifi ed where appropriate. When implementing the Better Work 
Projects in Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam, the Better Work Projects have 
worked with local stakeholders and have adopted the operation of the 
Better Work Project to refl ect local conditions. 
 The least-developed Better Work Project is the Better Work Lesotho 
Project. This project started with an action plan in May 2006 at the confer-
ence, Destination Lesotho: On the Road to Responsible Competitiveness. 32 
While Better Work Lesotho has not released reports thus far, it can be 
noted that Lesotho has ratifi ed the core ILO Conventions and has 
enacted domestic industrial relations laws, which on a brief inspection 
appear to provide adequate labor protections on paper. The Labor Code 
Order 1992 (Lesotho) provides for protection of wages in parts IV and 
VII, contracts, severance pay, and dismissal protection in part V, safety 
at work in part VIII, and contains some anti-discrimination provisions in 
part IX. In 2006, this law was amended by the Labor Code (Amendment) 
Act 2006 (Lesotho) which provided protection for people with HIV from 
discrimination and made some other administrative changes. 
 The Better Work Projects in Jordan and Vietnam are far more 
advanced than the project in Lesotho. The Better Work Jordan Project 
has a range of interventions to improve the competitiveness and labor 
conditions in its textile and apparel sector. Better Work Jordan is prepar-
ing to commence independent enterprise assessments to ascertain the 
level of compliance with ILO standards and Jordanian laws. 33 Following 
this step, the Better Work Jordan Project intends to engage in “training 
and remediation” to improve the respect for labor rights. Finally, this 
project will work towards shared solutions with government, employers, 
unions, and international buyers to improve labor conditions. 
 The Vietnam Better Work Project is the only Better Work Project that 
is fully operational, with the Better Work Vietnam Project commenc-
ing on July 30, 2009. 34 One of the motivations behind factories signing 
on to Better Factories Vietnam is the anticipated reduction in private 
factory corporate social responsibility inspections. 35 Currently, some 
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factories are audited several times a year by representatives in different 
supply chains. The Better Factories Vietnam Project aims to replace the 
repeated inspections by different supply chain representatives with one 
reliable yearly inspection. It is intended that the Better Work Vietnam 
Project inspection will have suffi cient creditability so that foreign supply 
chain representatives will be satisfi ed with relying on the Better Work 
Vietnam Project inspection, rather than performing their own private 
audits. Ms. Tara Rangarajan, Program Manager of Better Work Vietnam, 
explained: 
 The goal is to fi nd practical solutions that will decrease costs for 
project participants, enhance factory competitiveness in international 
markets, and reduce poverty among Vietnamese apparel workers, 
their families, and communities. … The focus of Better Work Vietnam 
is to make “practical improvements through a focus on workplace 
cooperation, combining independent assessments of labor standards 
with advice and training.” 36 
 Importantly, all the Better Work Projects have been modifi ed and 
developed with local support. In Jordan, the Jordanian government 
has worked with the ILO and the International Finance Corporation to 
develop the Better Work Jordan Project. 37 In Lesotho, the Project is being 
developed following consultations and contributions with key stakehold-
ers including buyers, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade 
unions, and government offi cials. 38 The Better Work Vietnam Project 
was developed with local stakeholders and the pilot Project steering 
committee includes Molise (which is the Ministry of the Government of 
Vietnam, which carries out the country’s administration of labor), VCCI 
(which is a national organization which represents Vietnam’s business 
community) and VGCL (which is a socio-political organization repre-
senting workers). 39 The fact that Better Work Projects are working with 
local stakeholders and are prepared to modify the model increases the 
probability that these Projects will be successful. This article now turns 
to analysing two major barriers which will arise in successfully imple-
menting the Better Work Projects: 
 • The absence of a trade agreement with trade incentives; and 
 • Ensuring the accuracy of Better Work Project factory audits and 
their economic and legal consequences. 
 Absence of a Trade Agreement with Trade Incentives 
 The most substantial difference between the establishment of the Better 
Work Project in Cambodia and the Projects in Jordan and Vietnam are 
the absence of international trade agreements with trade incentives. The 
positive incentive program associated with the Better Factories Cambodia 
Project motivated the Cambodian government to make substantial reforms 
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to its domestic laws and to make signifi cant efforts to enforce labor laws. 
The immediacy of trade incentives acted as a motivation for Cambodia 
and Cambodian factories to improve their respect for labor rights. Once 
the program was established and the trade incentives removed, the 
respect for labor rights continued. Without the support of trade incen-
tives, the Better Work Projects will need to fi nd a different motive to 
ensure suffi cient public and private support to enable the Projects in 
Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam to be implemented  successfully. 
 While it is diffi cult to speculate whether Jordan, Lesotho, and Vietnam 
will make similar efforts to Cambodia’s in implementing their Projects, it 
can be noted that it is crucial that Better Work encourages these jurisdic-
tions to review the operation of their domestic labor laws to ensure they 
comply with international standards. It is beyond the scope of this article 
to perform a review of Lesotho, Jordanian, and Vietnamese labor laws. 
It can be noted that there are substantial differences between the cover-
age of Jordanian and Vietnamese labor laws. For example, Section 2 of 
the Labor Code of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam protects all workers 
employed under employment contracts and other groups including train-
ees and domestic workers. The main labor law in Jordan has a far more 
limited coverage than the law in Vietnam. Act No. 8 of 1996 to Promulgate 
the Labor Law of Jordan provides workers with general employment pro-
tections including some anti-discrimination and occupational health and 
safety protections. This law however excludes a substantial number of 
vulnerable workers. Article 3 of the Act No. 8 of 1996 to Promulgate the 
Labor Law of Jordan excludes certain workers from the operation of the 
statute, including public and municipalities’ employees, family members 
of the employer who work in their business against no wage, domes-
tic workers, cooks, and people in similar occupations, and agricultural 
workers, unless provided for expressly by law or regulations. 
 This means that a large number of potentially vulnerable workers will 
receive no protection under the Labor Law of Jordan. For example, the 
operation of Article 3 means that all home-based textile and apparel 
workers will not gain industrial relations protection if they work for a 
family member without pay. This means if a wife and children work for 
their husband/father without receiving wages, they receive no labor pro-
tection. Home-based outworkers are a vulnerable sector of the economy 
and require protection. 40 It is crucial for the Better Work Jordan Project 
to fi nd vehicles to encourage Jordan to address this apparent regulatory 
gap in its laws. While it is positive that Lesotho, Jordan, and Vietnam 
have ratifi ed all the major ILO Conventions, it is crucial that Better Work 
identifi es strategies to motivate the country to ensure that the domestic 
legislation provides protection in accordance with ILO standards and 
that those laws are enforced. 
 In identifying potential strategies, the Better Work Projects need to fi nd 
motivations without seeming to punish these countries for participating in 
projects which are trying to improve labor conditions. For example, if one 
of these countries received additional negative attention from the Better 
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Work Projects because the country has problems with its labor laws, then 
this may result in that country being less willing to continue working with 
the Better Work Projects. Rather than substantially criticizing a country for 
its labor laws, perhaps the Better Work Projects could require participating 
countries to implement certain law reforms prior to the Project commenc-
ing. This would ensure there is a reduced variance between the Better 
Work Project audit criteria and the domestic state and should reduce the 
instance of companies receiving signifi cantly negative reports. 
 Perhaps the Better Work Projects could encourage countries to use 
their synthesis reports to demonstrate compliance with existing inter-
national obligations. This is especially relevant with Jordan, which has 
a free trade agreement with the United States entitled the Agreement 
Between the United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area (2000). This agree-
ment was the fi rst US Agreement to place the labor provisions in the 
main part of the Agreement and renders a dispute over these provisions 
subject to the general dispute resolution provisions. 41 Comparatively 
speaking to other US free trade agreements, the US–Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement has a reasonably strong social clause that requires Jordan to 
strive to ensure labor laws are enforced. 42 If the Better Work Projects 
are able to be successfully utilized by countries to demonstrate a level 
of compliance with labor rights, then perhaps future free trade agree-
ments may more heavily integrate auditing projects similar to the United 
States–Cambodia Bilateral Textile Trade Agreement. 
 As the Better Work Projects is primarily focused on auditing factories, 
perhaps the focus on providing micro-support and audit reports to fac-
tories may provide suffi cient motivation for those factories to respect 
labor rights. To support the Better Work Projects, governments could use 
their procurement practices to only purchase from factories that have 
reliable corporate social responsibility audits or have Better Work Project 
audits. A similar procurement program is currently in operation in some 
jurisdictions in the United States. 
 The development of procurement policies that are linked to labor 
rights has developed out of the sweat-free movement in the United 
States. This movement was started by the State of Maine, and requires all 
corporations that supply products to the public bodies associated with 
the State of Maine, not to have acquired those products from domestic 
or international sweatshops. 43 Similar laws have now been introduced 
in other jurisdictions, including California, 44 Pennsylvania, 45 Portland, 
Maine 46 New Jersey, 47 and San Francisco, California. 48 
 Ensuring the Accuracy of Better Work Project Factory 
Audits: Economic and Legal Consequences 
 The Better Factories Cambodia Project has blanket coverage over the 
textile and apparel industry in Cambodia. The Better Work Projects in 
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Jordan and Vietnam currently do not audit a signifi cant number of facto-
ries. As the Better Factory Projects in Jordan and Vietnam are still in their 
developmental stages, the scope of coverage is not surprising. However, 
if the participation of factories with the Better Work Projects does not 
increase substantially, then the nature of the Better Work Projects must 
alter. Better Factories Cambodia releases reports on how Cambodian 
labor laws are being respected at the macro and micro level. If the Better 
Work Projects in Jordan and Vietnam have a more limited role, it will 
be important for the Projects to focus upon reporting on Better Work 
Project participants only. 
 The different processes involved in producing micro reports when 
compared to macro reports can potentially threaten the Better Work 
Projects’ reputations. There are signifi cant differences between macro 
and micro reports. Macro reports generally comment upon the content 
of domestic laws, the extent of prosecutions, and whether those laws 
are being enforced generally. In developing these reports, institutions 
such as the ILO, work with the target country. In contrast, micro reports 
can focus upon the labor conditions in one single factory. Focusing 
upon micro reporting creates numerous logistical problems. For exam-
ple, the Better Work Projects may be able to have a reasonable under-
standing of a country’s accuracy on country-based reporting of labor 
rights and labor activities generally in that country. In determining how 
a state is likely to respond, the Better Work Project can draw from ILO 
reports and publications by the United Nations. In contrast, the Better 
Work Projects will need to understand the activities of private actors in 
those jurisdictions. Where there are only a few hundred countries in 
the world, there are literally millions of workplaces across the globe. 
For example, in 2000, the Asia Monitor Resource Centre reported there 
were over 5,000 toy factories across China, with a working population 
of over 1.3 million. 49 
 Perhaps one reason behind the ILO structuring the Better Work 
Projects as independent bodies was to isolate the ILO from any nega-
tive consequences fl owing from micro reporting. Alston has cautioned 
that the ILO’s move to promote rights at the micro level rather than 
focusing upon state compliance with treaties at the macro level has the 
potential to weaken the role of the ILO. 50 In creating the independent 
Better Work Projects, the ILO has reduced its micro-level involvement in 
these projects. This will enable the Better Work Projects to increase their 
expertise in micro-level auditing. When inspecting private entities, the 
Better Factory Projects must ensure that their inspections are performed 
in a way that reduces the possibility that factories are able to hide labor 
abuses from the inspectors. 
 Performing audits of factories is a substantially diffi cult process and 
even major players in the social auditing market have attracted criticism. 
For example, while accounting fi rms come with centuries of credibility 
with auditing fi nancial accounts, these entities failed to successfully audit 
corporate codes. Accounting fi rms proved to lack suffi cient expertise in 
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auditing environmental, employment, occupational safety and health, 
and other areas related to social responsibility. 51 In addition to account-
ing fi rms’ apparent lack of qualifi ed social auditors, for-profi t auditing 
fi rms were regarded by workers as merely an extension of management 
and were viewed with suspicion. O’Rourke has concluded: 
 [A]counting fi rms retained by manufacturers are not the appropriate 
organisations to be conducting audits of labor . . . conditions. Accounting 
fi rms such as Ernst & Young simply do not have the training, 
independence, or the trust of workers, to perform comprehensive, 
unbiased audits of working conditions. 52 
 To date, the Better Factories Cambodia Projects or the Better Work 
Projects focus only on auditing the factories and their workers. If that 
factory outsources production to home-based outworkers or small 
subcontractors, it is critical for the audits to include all parties in the 
factory’s supply chain. If audits do not incorporate the supply chains, 
there is a real risk that factories will simply outsource the labor abuses 
to smaller and harder to regulate subcontractors and outworkers. 
 It is crucial for the Better Work Projects to ensure that their factory 
audits are rigorous and do not attract criticism for failing to detect 
labor abuses. If the Better Work Projects do attract such criticism, these 
Projects will lose their creditability as independent experts and interna-
tional supply chains will likely stop relying on their Better Work Project 
reports to determine factories’ labor conditions. This could potentially 
undermine the ability of the Better Work Projects to encourage countries 
and factories to participate in the projects. 
 In addition to losing credibility, if the Better Work Projects provide 
negligent audit reports, they could be liable under US laws. Some cor-
porations have been accused of using factory audits as exculpatory 
propaganda—as a form of ideological social control rather than a genu-
ine effort to improve labor conditions. 53 The reliance upon apparently 
inaccurate factory audits came to a head in the US case of  Nike Inc. v 
Kasky . 54 In response to substantial negative media attention about labor 
conditions in their supply chains, protests, and a decline in sales, Nike 
launched a public relations blitz. 55 This public relations blitz largely 
consisted of Nike claiming it had complied with its corporate code of 
practice, and that labor conditions in its supplier factories was accept-
able. A consumer activist, Kasky, fi led suit against Nike, claiming, in 
effect, Nike was lying. Kasky claimed Nike was, in fact, acting socially 
irresponsibly, and that its public relations blitz consisted of false and 
misleading commercial statements in violation of California’s unfair trade 
practices and false advertising laws, found in the California Business & 
Professional Code. The unfair competition law defi nes “unfair competi-
tion” to include “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or prac-
tice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and any act 
prohibited by [the false advertising law].” 56 
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 Nike did not seek to deny that it had lied. To defend the case, Nike 
argued,  inter alia , that the claim was fl awed and that it should not be 
liable for its representations because it had a constitutional right to free 
speech in the First Amendment to the US Bill of Rights. In essence, Nike 
pleaded that constitutionally, it has a right to mislead the public in its 
corporate social responsibility propaganda. Piety explains Nike’s posi-
tion as follows: 
 [Kasky] claimed Nike lied, and Nike replied (in effect), “So what? The 
First Amendment protects everything your lawsuit alleges we said, 
even if we lied.” 57 
 This case was never heard on its facts. Nike attempted to have the 
case struck out on constitutional grounds through the lower courts, to 
the California Supreme Court and ultimately to the US Supreme Court. 
The US Supreme Court did not hand down a judgment on the sub-
stantive issues in the case. The US Supreme Court held  certiorari was 
“improvidently granted.” 58 Kasky’s claim was struck down and the verac-
ity of Nike’s public relations’ claims was never tested. Even though the 
US Supreme Court declined to hear the case and provide a precedent, 
human rights advocates have rated  Nike Inc. v Kasky as a victory, in the 
sense that it provides a warning to corporations and other entities that 
they run the risk of litigation if they use knowingly inaccurate or sus-
pect audit reports. 59 This means that if the Better Work Projects provide 
audited reports of factories and fail to identify substantial labor abuses 
in those factories, then there is a risk that the Better Work Projects could 
be sued. 
 THE BENEFIT OF BETTER WORK: CREATING ECONOMIC 
GROWTH THROUGH RIGHTS AND NOT THEIR ABUSE 
 The Better Work Projects represent an extremely positive policy shift 
for many developing countries. Previously, some countries aimed to cre-
ate economic growth through abusing labor rights. The most egregious 
policies to create economic growth through abusing labor rights can be 
evinced by special economic zones or export processing zones. These 
zones are geographical areas that are designated to be largely free from 
domestic regulation, providing that all products manufactured in the 
zone are exported outside the country. 60 
 Prior to the 1970s, Asian manufacturing factories generally manu-
factured products for domestic consumption. With the encouragement 
of major international institutions such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund, Asian nations developed special economic 
zones to assist in these states’ economic growth. 61 The purpose of these 
zones was, and continues to be, to attract investment in building fac-
tories and exporting goods in a regulatory environment that does not 
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enforce labor rights. Through abusing workers’ rights, factories are able 
to reduce costs and under cut factories that respect labor rights. For 
example, special economic zones were introduced in China,  inter alia , 
to develop economically and to improve the employment prospects of 
its under-utilized population. 62 Factories took advantage of these zones 
and exploited labor in the factories. 63 The introduction of special eco-
nomic zones as a vehicle for economic growth has resulted in substan-
tial adverse results for workers. 64 
 In contrast to special economic zones that aim to create economic 
growth through abusing rights, the Better Factories Projects aim to 
create economic growth through improving labor rights. The success 
of the Better Factories Cambodia Project has resulted in three jurisdic-
tions embracing the model of improving labor rights as an approach to 
improving economic growth. The policy shift that underpins the expan-
sion of the Better Work Projects has the potential to improve the lives of 
tens of millions of workers across the globe as states move away from 
abusing rights towards respecting workers’ rights. 
 CONCLUSION 
 In 1999, the ILO became involved with a dynamic project in Cambodia 
to improve respect for workers’ rights in the textile and apparel sector. 
This project became known as the Better Factories Cambodia Project. 
This project has been credited with improving the labor conditions 
of Cambodian workers. The success of the Better Factories Cambodia 
Project has resulted in the ILO expanding this concept into other jurisdic-
tions. The new Better Work Projects are developing Projects in Jordan, 
Lesotho, and Vietnam. This article has analysed the reasons behind 
the success of the Better Factories Cambodia Project and speculated 
whether the format of the emerging Better Work Projects will achieve 
similar success. 
 The major difference between the Better Factories Cambodia Project 
and the emerging Better Work Projects is the motivation countries have 
to be involved. The Better Factories Cambodia Project was created as part 
of an international trade agreement that provided Cambodian exports 
increased access to trade with the United States if the ILO determined 
that Cambodian factories were complying with ILO labor standards and 
Cambodian labor laws. This created a signifi cant trade incentive for the 
Cambodian government and factories to respect labor rights. In contrast, 
the new Better Work Projects are not associated with any international 
trade agreement involving incentives to improve labor rights. The Better 
Work Projects rely on improving the effi ciencies of, and attracting sup-
ply chains to, participating jurisdictions. While the Better Work Projects 
offer enormous resources to participating countries, the level of this 
support may not motivate the same level of compliance as incentives 
linked to an international trade agreement. If states participating in the 
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Better Work Projects are not committed, this creates a potential barrier 
to these Projects’ success. As the Better Work Projects will be perform-
ing factory audits, the Projects will attract negative publicity and litiga-
tion if labor abuses emerge in audited factories. Under the Better Work 
Vietnam Projects, factories will only be audited once a year. This creates 
a large window of opportunity for factories to abuse workers’ rights. 
The success of the Project will therefore depend upon the ability of 
participating countries to enact and enforce domestic laws. To support 
the Better Factories Cambodia Project, Cambodia enacted new laws and 
enforced those laws. Countries that participate with the Better Work 
Projects should be expected to review their domestic laws to ensure 
they meet ILO standards, review those laws where appropriate, and 
enforce those laws. While the development of the Better Work Projects 
will be complex, if the improvement in labor rights from Cambodia can 
be replicated in other states, then the ILO’s decision to devote resources 
for micro-level development will be vindicated. 
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